Changes in the terms of trade affect both the incentives and the ability of individuals to purchase education in a credit-constrained economy. A model is developed that shows how individual decision-making is affected in a small economy when it opens up to trade. Empirical results indicate that credit constraints are an important factor influencing school enrollment rates, particularly in low income countries. As a result, countries with low human capital stocks tend to increase their accumulation of human capital with increased trade. The response in high income countries is more muted.
Introduction
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade theory uses the concept of comparative advantage based on factor endowments as a rationale for international trade. Under free trade, it predicts equalization of factor prices across countries and, when trade is liberalized, the HOS model predicts increases in returns to the relatively abundant factor of production in each country. Straightforward dynamic adaptations of these static results permit one to conclude that, as the incentive to accumulate the relatively abundant factor in each country increases, endowments of factor supplies should diverge even further as a result of trade. When human capital is considered as a factor of production, this result implies that trade should cause countries to have diverging stocks of human capital.
This prediction is not consistent with empirical observations. In spite of increasing levels of trade, the world distribution of human capital is becoming more, rather than less, equal. In 1960, the standard deviation of the log of the average years of education across 88 countries was 0.91. By 1985, this measure of inequality had decreased to 0.61.1 This paper reconciles this observation with the traditional theory of comparative advantage by examining how trade's effect on the distribution of income within each country may also play a role in influencing the accumulation of human capital.2 Empirical evidence is presented that shows that international trade has a positive effect on the accumulation of human capital in countries in which human empirical references.) The focus in the model of this paper is slightly different from that of previous work, making the point that trade may not affect all countries in the same way and offering an explanation as to why a direct relationship between trade and growth has been difficult to uncover empirically.
The importance of human capital in explaining patterns of trade was first invoked as an explanation for the Leontief paradox-the observation that the United States, a relatively capital abundant economy, exported labor intensive goods. In the early 1950s, Leontief (1956) tried to resolve this paradox by arguing that because U.S. workers were more productive than foreigners, it was legitimate to reduce the U.S. capital-to-labor ratio before assessing the comparative advantage of the U.S. Later authors used the theory of human capital to formalize this thinking by recognizing that U.S. exports were actually human-capital intensive and thus the U.S. was exporting the good in which it had a comparative advantage. Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) extend the HOS theory to incorporate the accumulation of human capital into a dynamic two-good model using skilled and unskilled labor as the factors of production. Unskilled labor becomes skilled labor through investment of physical resources and time in the educational sector. Because credit markets are perfect in their model, the amount of education purchased depends solely on the returns to skilled and unskilled labor. As a result, when trade alters the payments to skilled and unskilled labor in favor of the relatively abundant factor, incentives to purchase education become more disparate, and the country with the higher initial level of human capital accumulates more human capital, whereas the country with the low initial level of human capital accumulates less.
More recently, Davis and Reeve (1997) and Stokey (1996) have reexamined this issue in a different light. Davis and Reeve (1997) build on the Findlay and Kierzkowski framework to examine human capital accumulation in an open economy when there are differences in labor market institutions between the trading economies. They show how the introduction of a minimum wage and unemployment can explain differences in the skill premium, unemployment, and the growth rate of skill accumulation. Stokey (1996) has a different perspective, focusing on the increase in capital flows that occurs when a country integrates into the world economy. In her work, as physical capital accumulates, the incentive to accumulate human capital increases, causing increased openness to be associated with greater accumulation of human capital. Though she does not empirically test her model, it arrives at a very different conclusion from that of Findlay and Kierzkowski-all countries should have increased human capital stocks as they become more open. This paper makes yet a third empirical prediction-human capital accumulation will increase as a result of trade in some, but perhaps not all countries. Contrary to the predictions of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) , if trade's effect on income is strong enough, low human capital economies, exporting the unskilled-intensive good can actually see an increase in human capital accumulation.
The model in this paper is most similar in spirit to that of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) . However, in this model, credit markets are not perfect, and the distribution of income affects a country's stock of human capital. In the economy described below, parents can increase the incomes of their children by investing in their children's education. However, because parents care about their own consumption as well as the future income of their children, there is a minimum level of income that parents niust have before they begin to invest in their children's education.
International trade between countries with different levels of human capital affects individuals within these two countries in two opposing ways. In the country with the higher human capital stock, the incentive to accumulate human capital increases, but parents with low skills (and low incomes) experience a reduction in their incomes. In the country with the lower human capital stock, the incentive to accumulate human capital decreases, but parents with low skills now experience an increase in their incomes. If the effect of the change in the low-skilled parents' incomes is strong enough, this model provides the result that trade increases the accumulation of human capital in the country with low human capital. The accumulation of human capital in the country with a high initial level of human capital may also increase or decrease, depending again on the strength of the income and incentive effects.
Because the model does not provide unambiguous predictions, the actual effect of trade on the accumulation of human capital then becomes a question to be answered empirically.
Empirical results discussed in section 3 suggest that the effect of the change in incomes is in fact more important than the effect of the change in the returns to education, particularly in less developed countries. Increases in openness have a positive effect on enrollment ratios in countries with lower human capital stocks and a very small or negative effect on countries with higher human capital stocks. This result explains why trade has not caused increased dispersion of levels of education, as the unmodified version of HOS theory would predict.
To highlight the mechanisms by which trade affects the accumulation of human capital, section 2 of this paper lays out a stylized overlapping generations model that describes the basic elements of production and individual decision-making. Section 3 discusses empirical tests of the relationship between changes in openness to trade and school enrollment ratios, and section 4 concludes.
Theoretical Framework

Production
This section offers a simple model that provides an analytical framework for considering the effects of trade on human capital accumulation. Let the production of the two goods in this economy, good X and good Z, be described by a constant returns to scale production technology that uses human capital, H, and unskilled labor, L. The production technology for good Z is more human capital intensive than the technology of good X for any relative price. In addition, assume prices of both goods are within an interval that allows both goods to be produced in equilibrium. There is no population growth and the size of the population is normalized to 1. Galor (1992) analyzes production in a similar two-sector overlapping generations economy and shows that the Stolper-Samuelson relationships apply: an increase in the relative price of the unskilled-labor-intensive good (good X) increases the wages paid to unskilled labor, increases the ratio of unskilled labor wages to skilled labor wages, and, moreover, the elasticity of the change in the unskilled wage with respect to price is greater than one. Thus, an increase in the price of the unskilled-labor-intensive good increases the real income of a unit of unskilled labor. Conversely, an increase in the price of the skilled-labor-intensive good increases the real income of a unit of skilled labor. The model below uses this result as a starting point to illustrate how the change in the price of goods that result from increased openness to trade can affect the accumulation of human capital. As can be seen by combining Equations 1 and 2, the accumulation of education is influenced by the benefits of education relative to its costs. When the parent's income is relatively low, the benefits of education (the discrepancy between wages to educated and uneducated workers) must be high to generate a value of y* that is lower than the parent's income. Thus, an increase in parents' income or an increase in the incentives to become educated (a lower y*) could generate larger school enrollments.
Accumulation of Human Capital
In a small open economy in which both goods are produced, wages are determined in the world market. Thus, given wages, a steady-state equilibrium is one in which the percent of workers who are educated is constant through time. Specifically, let X(Xt_-; We, Wu) kt = jf Y(y, t_1; we, wu) dy.
Then we can define the steady-state enrollment rate as A = X(X; Wu, we)
In the steady state, the aggregate enrollment rate does not change, but individual families In case i, the discrepancy between wages to educated and uneducated parents is so large that even the highest ability uneducated parents cannot afford to purchase education for their children, but the lowest ability educated parents can afford education. As a result, children of educated parents always get an education, whereas children of uneducated parents never do. In case ii, wages paid to even the highest ability educated parents are not high enough to allow their children to become educated and nobody purchases an education. Finally, in case iii, wages to even the lowest ability uneducated parents are high enough so that they purchase education for their children and everybody becomes educated.9 When there is mobility in the steady state, the number of downwardly mobile families (educated parents with uneducated children) must equal the number of upwardly mobile families (uneducated parents with educated children). Define a to be the lowest level of ability for which uneducated parents purchase an education for their children, and define a to be the cutoff level of ability below which educated parents do not purchase education for their children. Then, aWu aw = = y*, and a steady state with mobility exists if a < a < a < a. In the steady state, , that greater upward mobility increases the steady-state enrollment rate, whereas greater downward mobility decreases it. Thus, given wages, a cost of education, and a distribution of ability, the economy will go to either one of the three steady states with no mobility or the steady state with some mobility. 8 Owen and Weil (1998) examine a similar model in which wages are endogenous (as they would be in a closed economy version of the model above) and show that multiple equilibria are possible: steady states with and without mobility will exist as long as the cost of education is not too high. 9 Only the cases in which w, > wu are considered here. We can rule out wu > w, as long as, in the rest of the world, there is a cost to education. We could also rule out cases ii and iii of Equation 3 if both uneducated and educated labor were necessary for production. In this case, the wages determined in the rest of the world would not be consistent with either no educated workers or no uneducated workers.
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In case i of the no-mobility steady states, the initial distribution of skills, o0, determines all subsequent distributions-children of uneducated parents will never get educated and children of educated parents will always get educated. However, in all other cases, initial conditions do not matter. When the cost of education is the same as in the rest of the world, the distribution of education within any one small open economy will match the distribution of education in the world economy.
Impact of Trade
Though highly stylized, the model above can be used to examine how an unexpected permanent change in the terms of trade (e.g., removal of tariffs) will affect the accumulation of human capital in a small open economy. As is customary in models of trade, I assume that, while goods flow freely between countries, the two factors of production do not cross international boundaries and there is no international lending or borrowing. Thus, trade causes a change in the relative price of goods, and through the Stolper-Samuelson relations, in the real income of skilled and unskilled labor.
The model highlights two factors that determine human capital investment-parents' income and relative wages. Both of these factors are influenced by the changing relative wages resulting from trade. For example, consider two countries, A and B. In Country A, unskilled labor is relatively abundant and in Country B, educated labor is relatively abundant, that is, KA < XB. Consequently, when Country A opens up to trade, it exports the unskilled-labor-intensive good and per capita income increases, but unskilled labor takes the greater share of the increase. Therefore, the increased incomes of uneducated parents could result in more children of uneducated parents getting an education. However, in Country A, relative wages to the unskilled also increase, decreasing the incentive to accumulate human capital (i.e., raising y*), possibly preventing the children of uneducated parents from obtaining an education, even though their parents are now richer. Conversely, a relatively skilled parent in Country A will see a decrease in income and incentive for educating children.
We We can see from Equation 6 that aa/aWe < 0 but is decreasing in Wu/We, and the sign of da/awu is undetermined but is likely to be negative when Wu/We is small. Thus, upward mobility is likely to increase (a decreases) in the less developed country when it opens up to trade if the discrepancy between wages to educated and uneducated workers is large. It is possible, however, that upward mobility may not increase even if a decreases if the economy was originally in a no-mobility steady state and the decrease in a was not large enough to push it below a. On the other hand, the threshold level of ability below which educated parents do not educate their children, a = y*/we, unambiguously increases when the less developed economy opens up to trade (y* increases and we decreases). This would cause an increase in downward mobility if a increases above a. If it does not, then downward mobility continues to be nonexistent, and the children of educated parents will always get educated.
To summarize, the effect on the steady-state enrollment rate in the less developed economy depends on the relative changes in upward and downward mobility. The steady-state enrollment rate will increase if an increase in upward mobility is larger than the decrease in downward mobility. It will decrease if either upward mobility decreases or the increase in upward mobility is small relative to the increase in downward mobility. Finally, the steady-state enrollment rate might not change if the economy was originally in a no-mobility steady state and the changes in wages and incentives are too small to affect upward and/or downward mobility. The direction and magnitude of the change in upward mobility in the less developed economy depends on the relative importance of the income effect, which encourages investment in education by children of poor parents, and the incentive effect, which discourages investment in education. If the income effect is strong enough, Country A could actually experience an increase in human capital accumulation even though the incentive to accumulate human capital has decreased. The analysis of the effects of trade in the more developed, human-capital-abundant economy mirrors that of the less developed economy. When Country B opens up to trade, we increases and wu decreases. Given this fact and noting Equations 5 and 6 once again, we can see that the same conditions that generate increased upward mobility in the less developed economy will generate decreased upward mobility in the more developed economy. Similarly, a = y*/we, the threshold level of ability below which educated parents do not educate their children, unambiguously declines in the more developed economy, potentially generating less downward mobility. As in the case of the less developed economy, if the more developed economy was originally in a no-mobility steady state and the changes in incomes and incentives were small, there would be no change in the amount of upward and downward mobility and, thus, no change in the resulting steady-state enrollment rate. Just as in the less developed economy, we cannot predict the overall effect of trade on the enrollment rate in the more developed economy. Downward mobility decreases because both the income of educated parents and the incentive to educate children increases. Upward mobility may decrease or increase depending on the net effect of the decrease in uneducated parents' incomes and the increase in incentive to educate children. If the effect of increased incentives dominates, decreased downward mobility will dominate any possible decrease in upward mobility, and the steady-state enrollment rate will increase. On the other hand, if the income effect on the uneducated is strong enough, decreased upward mobility may outweigh decreased downward mobility, and the steady-state enrollment will decrease, despite the increased incentives to become educated in the developed economy. where e,t is a school enrollment rate of country i at time t, o,, is its level of openness, Yi,t is " Openness is (exports + imports)/GDP, from the Penn World Tables 5.6. Gross enrollment ratios are shown. Gross enrollment ratios equal the number of people enrolled in a level of schooling divided by the age group typically enrolled in that level of schooling. They can be greater than one. Data for college enrollment ratios are available for a smaller number of countries than are data for secondary school enrollment ratios. The data are discussed more thoroughly below. 12 One might also test elements of the model with microeconomic data, but it would not be possible to discern an overall macroeconomic effect from this approach. (1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 ), for a total of 525 observations. Using tertiary enrollment ratios reduces the number of countries to 64 (448 observations). Table 1 provides some summary descriptive statistics for the data. Equation 7 is a dynamic fixed effects model. Nickell (1981) shows that estimating such a model with panel data using a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach results in biased coefficients. Since then, several solutions have been proposed, including an instrumental variables estimator by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in which the fixed effect is removed by taking a first difference and then using a twice lagged value of the dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged value of the dependent variable. More recently, Kiviet (1995) Table 2 presents results from estimation of Equation 7 for secondary enrollment ratios using three different estimation techniques. Focusing on the first column, results from the corrected LSDV estimation show that growth of openness is positively related to growth in enrollment rates, but that effect tapers off in more educated economies and becomes negative for highly educated economies. Using the coefficients estimated in the first column, one can calculate that the level of education, h, for which the effect of openness on school enrollment ratios becomes negative, is 5.3 years. Over the entire estimation period, a little more than two thirds of the sample is below this point. Thus, for the majority of countries, increased trade has 16 The appendix provides some details on estimation of the coefficients of the corrected LSDV estimator. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap method. See Kiviet (1995) or Judson and Owen (1997) for further discussion of these techniques. GAUSS programs for estimating the corrected LSDV are available from the author on request. had a positive effect on secondary school education. In the model of the previous section, this result would be obtained if the increase in incomes to uneducated parents was relatively important and generated increased upward mobility.
Results
Intuition for the second implication of these estimates, that trade has had a negative effect on enrollment ratios for a little less than one third of the sample, can also be gained from the model. Upward mobility decreases in the human-capital-abundant economies if the decrease in uneducated parents' incomes as a result of trade is large relative to the change in the incentives to get their children educated.
This second result, however, must be stated more cautiously. Although it is true that the point estimates of the coefficients lead to this conclusion, it is not robust to using coefficients that are one standard deviation higher than the point estimates. (Kiviet [1995] shows that it is only the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable that suffers from an LSDV bias of any magnitude.) Table 3 provides similar estimates for college enrollment ratios. These results are consistent with the results using secondary school enrollment ratios, but they are weaker. Only the LSDV correction yields significant results for any of the change in openness variables. In the first column, the growth rate of openness is positively associated with the growth rate of college enrollment rates, and the interaction term, though negative, is insignificant. The second column uses the difference in openness rather than its growth rate and reports a significant finding for both the change in openness and the change in openness interacted with the level of education, similar to the one found for secondary school enrollment ratios. The values of the coefficients in column two of Table 3 imply that the turning point level of education for which changes in openness have a negative effect on growth rates of enrollment ratios is about 14 years. No countries in the sample have average education levels that high, suggesting, as above, that trade has a positive impact on human capital accumulation but that impact is more pronounced in less developed economies.
The fact that no countries in the sample have education levels high enough to detect a negative impact of trade on changes in college enrollment rates may also help explain why the interaction term is not significant in the first column. A final point about the results in Table 3 78 Ann L. Owen is that the magnitude of the coefficient on openness in the college enrollment estimations is larger than that of the secondary enrollment estimations. It is possible that the income and incentive effects trade creates for college enrollment across all countries in the sample is greater than the income and incentive effects it creates for secondary school enrollment. In fact, a calculation similar to the one performed above for secondary school enrollment rates indicates that college enrollment rates would grow about 18 percentage points faster in high-income countries and 22 percentage points faster in low-income countries in response to a one standard deviation increase in trade growth.
These results argue for a generally positive relationship between human capital accumulation and international trade, particularly in less developed economies. The model above aids in the interpretation of these results by highlighting a channel through which trade can raise the incomes of the unskilled in less developed economies, allowing the children of unskilled workers to become more educated. In the more developed economies, increased trade has a smaller or even negative impact on enrollment ratios. This smaller effect may be due to smaller income and/or incentive effects in the high-income countries. Nonetheless, the model and empirical results do reconcile the observation that the worldwide distribution of human capital is converging with the presence of international trade based on comparative advantage. Contrary to a straightforward application of the HOS theory, trade increases the accumulation of human capital in countries where human capital is the relatively scarce factor of production. Its effect in economies where human capital is relatively abundant is more muted. This result reconciles the converging distribution of human capital across countries with traditional trade theory and increases our understanding of the impact of trade.
Conclusion
These results indicate that the reduced incentive to become educated in a low-income country may be trivial in comparison to the increased incomes enjoyed by low-skill workers. In addition, the change in incentives and income in the human-capital-abundant economies that result from trade are a less important determinant of human capital accumulation.
Because a country's human capital stock is an important determinant of long-run growth, the impact of trade on its accumulation establishes another link between growth and trade. The findings in this paper suggest that the redistribution of income in less developed economies that can occur as a result of trade may be an important factor influencing human capital accumulation.
